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SUMMARY 
Even i f  both prospective be l l ige ren t s  expect t o  su f f e r  
major damage i n  general war, decision-makers i n  each country 
a r e  l i k e l y  t o  f e e l  t h a t  the re  i s  a premium i n  s t r i k i n g  f i r s t  
i f  they bel ieve war has become inevi table .  In  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  
the  danger of inadvertent  general war--a war which occurs even 
though both s ides  prefer  peace--will be s ign i f i can t .  Various 
events extraneous t o  t he  s t r a t e g i c  balance may p r ec ip i t a t e  
general war. These t r i g g e r s  include p o l i t i c a l  c r i s e s ,  l o c a l  
wars, de l i be r a t e  c a t a l y t i c  ac t ion  by Nth countr ies  o r  by 
individuals ,  sabotage, mischief and espionage, and l i t e r a l  
accidents.  These events could compel a general war by making 
one o r  both s ides  bel ieve t h a t  such a war had become inev i t -  
ab le  and t h a t  t h e  only prudent choice was t o  launch a f i r s t  
s t r i k e .  
A r m s  cont ro l  can reduce t he  danger of inadvertent  general 
war i n  two ways. The l ikel ihood of t r igger ing  events can be 
diminished. Should they nevertheless occur, measures can be 
taken t o  avoid automatic p rec ip i t a t ion  of a l l -ou t  war. A 
number of s t eps  might be taken t o  prevent t he  explosion of 
l o c a l  wars i n t o  general wars. Atom-free zone agreements and 
arrangements t o  dea l  with mischief and accidents  might a l s o  be 
of value. 
A d i r e c t  Soviet-American communication system a s  wel l  a s  
o ther  procedures which would go i n t o  e f f e c t  during a c r i s i s  
might contr ibute  t o  s t a b i l i z i n g  t he  s t r a t e g i c  balance. The 
development of slow-reacting s t r a t e g i c  systems--forces which 
do not depend on warning f o r  t h e i r  survival  and which do not 
appear provocative when going on an alert--would subs tan t i a l ly  
reduce t he  danger of inadvertent  general war. 
Such agreements would have t o  be negotiated on a very 
informal basis .  Much could be accomplished through u n i l a t e r a l  
ac t ion  by t he  United S ta tes .  Negotiations with t he  Soviets  on 
these  arrangements should be separated from t r a d i t i o n a l  
propaganda-oriented formal negotiat ions.  
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A major objec t ive  of American mi l i t a ry  policy is t o  prevent 
a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which we o r  t he  Russians a r e  forced t o  launch a 
general war by events extraneous t o  the  s t r a t e g i c  balance. We 
are in te res ted  i n  t he  development of a "stablen balance which 
can withstand pressures generated by t he  cold war. 
We a r e  l i k e l y  soon--if we have not  already--to move i n t o  
a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which t he  probable outcbme of a s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r -  
change is such t h a t  ne i the r  s i de ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  normal circum- 
stances,  could consider general war a r a t i o n a l  instrument of 
policy. The development by both s ides  of r e l a t i v e l y  invulnerable 
s t r a t e g i c  forces  would reduce t he  incentive t o  s t r i k e  f i r s t  and 
increase t he  l e v e l  of des t ruct ion  which t he  s ide  receiving t he  
a t t ack  could i n f l i c t  i n  t he  second s t r i k e .  However, even given 
t h i s  development, decision-makers might bel ieve t h a t  severa l  
d i f f e r e n t  outcomes would r e s u l t  from a s t r a t e g i c  interchange: 
(1 )  the  s ide  launching t he  f irst  s t r i k e  would expect t o  su f f e r  
major damage, but it might nevertheless a l s o  expect t o  "prevailn 
i n  t he  sense t h a t  it could d i c t a t e  t he  terms f o r  ending h o s t i l i -  
t i e s ;  ( 2 )  both s ides  would bel ieve the re  would be equal and major 
damage no matter who s t r i k e s  f i r s t ;  ( 3 )  t h e  s i de  s t r i k i n g  f i r s t  
would expect t o  su f f e r  g rea te r  damage and l o se  t he  war. 
Given s i t u a t i o n  ( 2 )  o r  s i t ua t i on  ( 3 )  t h e  danger of general 
war would be subs t an t i a l l y  reduced. However, f o r  subjec t ive  a s  
w e l l  a s  objec t ive  reasons w e  a r e  not l i k e l y  t o  move beyond 
s i t ua t i on  (1) i n  t he  foreseeable fu ture .  A s  long a s  both s ides  
r e l y  on extremely vulnerable a i r c r a f t ,  a  f i r s t  s t r i k e  with 
miss i les  w i l l  s ubs t an t i a l l y  reduce t he  s i z e  of t h e  opponentTs 
s t r i k e .  Command and control  systems a r e  l i k e l y  t o  remain 
vulnerable; s ince  con t ro l  may break down o r  t h e  w i l l  t o  
r e t a l i a t e  may be l o s t ,  t h e  second s t r i k e  may not be launched 
or  may be very desultory.  Decision-makers, even i n  t h e  face  
of a  complicated analys is  leading t o  t he  contrary conclusion, 
a r e  l i k e l y  t o  bel ieve t h a t  t he  execution of a  well-planned 
f i r s t  s t r i k e  w i l l  produce an advantage over a confused and 
demoralized second s t r i k e .  I n  addi t ion  psychological pressures 
t o  a c t  o r  t o  s e i ze  con t ro l  of t he  s i t u a t i o n  may i n  a  c r i s i s  
lead  t o  t he  decis ion t o  launch an a t t ack .  
The remainder of  t h i s  paper i s  concerned with t h e  world 
s i t u a t i o n  (1 ) ;  i .e . ,  t h e  s i de  launching t he  f i r s t  s t r i k e  would 
expect t o  emerge with major losses  (say,  two t o  twenty mi l l ion  
ca sua l t i e s ) ,  but it might nevertheless a l s o  expect t o  "prevai lv  
i n  t he  sense t h a t  it could perhaps d i c t a t e  t he  terms f o r  ending 
h o s t i l i t i e s .  I n  such a s i t u a t i o n ,  t he  s t r a t e g i c  balance, while 
r e l a t i v e l y  s t ab l e ,  could be upset.  Administration spokesmen 
have recen t ly  argued t h a t  t he  United S t a t e s  would now win a 
s t r a t e g i c  war no matter  who went f i r s t .  m e  Soviet  l eaders ,  
however, may not  have t h e  same image of t he  cur ren t  s i t ua t i on .  
I n  any case ,  a s  t he  Soviet  miss i l e  force  increases i n  s i z e  and 
invu lnerab i l i ty ,  we a r e  l i k e l y  t o  en te r  s i t u a t i o n  (1) i f  we a r e  
not the re  already.  This paper w i l l  d i scuss  events which might 
upset the  balance and arms control  measures t o  d e a l  with these  
events and reduce t he  danger of pre-emption by moving towards 
s i t u a t i o n  (2) ,  i n  which decision-makers would not  perceive any 
advantage i n  s t r i k i n g  f i r s t .  
CHAPTER I1 
POTENTIAL TRIGGERS OF INADVERTENT GENERAL W A R  
There a r e  severa l  ways i n  which events and pressures 
extraneous t o  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  balance might lead  t o  general war. 
One s ide  (o r  both) might decide t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  war was pref-  
erable  t o  t he  l i k e l y  outcome of t he  current  s i t u a t i o n  ( L e e ,  
t he  l e v e l  of "acceptabletT damage could be lowered) or  one s ide  
(o r  both) might be convinced t h a t  general war was inevi table  
and t h a t  t he  only decis ion l e f t  was who was going t o  s t r i k e  
f i r s t  ( i .e . , pre-emptive urges might be induced) .l 
The process by which extraneous events lead t o  general war 
r e s u l t s  e i t h e r  from changing est imates of t he  fu tu re  without 
general war o r  from changing est imates of t he  l ikel ihood of 
general war. The former case suggests the  need f o r  r e s t r a i n t  
on both s ides  i n  exploi t ing  a p o l i t i c a l  advantage. The fee l ing  
of pessimism about a fu tu re  without war may compound t he  danger 
of inadvertent  war, 
Wars of t h i s  kind a r e  o f ten  iden t i f i ed  by severa l  d i f f e r e n t  
names--7taccidenta1, I tca ta ly t ic ,  IT Itunpremeditated , Itwar by m i s -  
ca lcula t ion ,"  e t c .  I n  essence these  a r e  ac tua l ly  a l l  t h e  - same. 
They a l l  i den t i f y  an TtinadvertentTt general war--a war t h a t  
occurs even though both s ides  prefer  peace. Such a war can 
occur only i f  one s s b e c o m e s  convinced t h a t  it does not  have 
1. There might be changes i n  t he  s t r a t e g i c  balance i t s e l f  
which would bring on war. Technological advances might make a 
f i r s t  s t r i k e  seem a t t r a c t i v e .  
t h i s  choice and would prefer  t o  s t r i k e  f i r s t  i f  general war i s  
ce r t a i n ,  o r  t h a t  t he  l ike l ihood of general war i s  s o  g rea t  t h a t  
t he  only prudent view i s  t o  assume t h a t  it i s  ce r ta in .  
Thus t h e  danger of inadvertent  war r e s t s 2  
on the  same premise t h a t  underl ies  pre-emptive war-- 
t h a t  the re  i s  an enormous advantage, i n  the  event war 
occurs, i n  s t a r t i n g  it (or  enormous advantage, i n  t h e  
event it seems t o  have s t a r t ed ,  i n  responding 
i n s t an t l y )  and t h a t  each s ide  w i l l  be not  only con- 
scious of t h i s  but conscious of t he  o the r ' s  preoccu- 
pat ion with it. It seems qui teunl ikely  t h a t  war 
would be brought about by an...accident...if the re  
were not some urgency of responding before t he  evi-  
dence is in.  The essence of a f a l s e  alarm i s  t h a t ,  
i f  one f a i l s  t o  a c t  upon it, it i s  seen t o  have been 
a f a l s e  alarm. An accident i s  almost c e r t a i n  t o  be 
recognized a s  an accident ,  i f  war has not intervened 
meanwhile. And among a l l  those who may have it i n  
t h e i r  power t o  bring about a provocative event t h a t  
might p r ec ip i t a t e  t he  decisions t h a t  bring about war, 
very few, i f  any, would have t he  power t o  wage a 
persuasive imi ta t ion  of war i f  t he  consequences of 
t h e i r  ac t ions  could be assessed and analyzed f o r  even 
a br ief  period of time. Thus TTaccidentaln war i s  war 
t h a t  may be i n i t i a t e d  on misinformation, incomplete 
evidence o r  misunderstanding, of a kind t h a t  could 
l i k e l y  be cleared up were it not t h a t  t he  time t o  
c l e a r  it up might seem a d i sas t rous  delay t o  a govern- 
ment confronted with t h e  pos s ib i l i t y  t h a t  war has 
already s t a r t ed .  "Accidental warn i s ,  f o r  t he  most 
pa r t ,  pre-emptive war sparked by some occurrence t h a t  
was unpredictable,  outs ide  the  contro l  of t he  main 
pa r t i c ipan t s  and unintended by them, 
It would, therefore ,  not  be t he  events themselves t h a t  would 
d i r e c t 1  b r G g  about war. These occurrences provoke decisions 
d n g  about war. The problem is  not so le ly  one of preventing 
t he  events; it i s  equally,  o r  even more, one of f o r e s t a l l i n g  t he  - 
kinds of decisions t h a t  might lead t o  war a s  a r e s u l t  of these  
events. 
2. Thomas C. Schell ing and Morton H. Halperin S t r a t e  and 
Arms Control (New York: The Twentieth Century Fu;d* 
pp. 15-16, 
P o l i t i c a l  c r i s e s ,  l o c a l  wars, sabotage, mischief and 
espionage, "ca ta ly t icTr  ac t ions  and waccidentsv might be t h e  
t r i gge r  which touches off  a general  war. The ways i n  which 
each of these  events increases t he  l ike l ihood of inadvertent  
general  war a r e  discussed below. 
POLITICAL CRISIS 
P o l i t i c a l  c r i s e s  may t r i g g e r  inadvertent  war because 
ne i the r  s i de  f inds  it possible t o  back down, because con t ro l  
over events i s  l o s t ,  o r  because one s i de  f inds  i t s e l f  l o s ing  
and rev i ses  i t s  est imates of t he  damage it w i l l  accept  i n  a 
general war. These pressures and t he  tens ions  and f a t i gue  
which develop i n  a c r i s i s  re inforce  t h e  same kinds of pre- 
emptive urges which a r i s e  a s  a r e s u l t  of t he  o ther  events t o  
be discussed below. 
During a major p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  each s i d e  is  constant ly  
aware of t h e  danger of general  war. On each day it must decide 
whether t o  s t r i k e  and whether o r  not  it expects t h e  o the r  s i de  
t o  s t r i k e .  I f  t he  c r i s i s  lasts long enough o r  ge t s  confused 
enough it may on i t s  own touch off  a pre-emptive s t r i k e .  Local 
m i l i t a ry  ac t ion ,  accidents ,  c a t a l y t i c -  ac t ion ,  and sabotage a r e  
more l i k e l y  t o  occur during a c r i s i s  and more l i k e l y  during a 
p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  t o  lead  t o  war. 
I f  a nuclear explosion could, due t o  pre-emptive urges, 
lead  t o  war i n  a r e l a t i v e l y  calm s i t u a t i o n ,  t h i s  i s  even more 
l i k e l y  t o  happen during a c r i s i s .  Not only would decision- 
makers on both s ides  be t i r e d  and t ense ,  but  they would be pre- 
occupied with t he  danger of general  war. Thus a p o l i t i c a l  
c r i s i s  by i t s e l f  o r  i n  combination with another event might 
t r i g g e r  an inadvertent  general  war . 3  
LOCAL WAR - 
A l o c a l  war ( i .e . , a war not  involving Soviet  o r  American 
t e r r i t o r y  but i n  which t h e  two powers a r e  supporting opposing 
l o c a l  fo rces )  might produce an inadvertent  general  war e i t h e r  by 
3 .  During a c r i s i s  both s i de s  might go on a l e r t ,  reducing 
t he  advantage of s t r i k i n g  f i r s t .  However, i f  the  c r i s i s  i s  
prolonged t h e  a l e r t  s t a t u s  may degrade with a corresponding 
advantage i n  going f i r s t .  
inducing a pre-emptive s t r i k e  o r  by gradually expanding s o  t h a t  
it slowly and almost imperceptibly becomes a general  war. 
Even a t  low l eve l s  l o c a l  war w i l l  increase  tens ions .  Both 
s ides  w i l l  become increas ingly  aware of t h e  h o s t i l i t y  between 
them, more aware of t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a l l  t h e i r  d i spu tes  
w i l l  be s e t t l e d  by fo rce ,  and perhaps more prone t o  decide t h a t  
general  war has become s o  l i k e l y  t h a t  it i s  time t o  s t r i k e .  
F inal ly ,  l i t e r a l  accidents  of various kinds (explosion of 
nuclear weapons, f o r  example) a r e  much more l i k e l y  during a 
period of l o c a l  war, and such accidents  a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  
t r i g g e r  general war during a period of tension.  
Further ,  one o r  both s ides  may de l i be r a t e ly  r i s k  t h e  danger 
of inadvertent  war. One s i de  may f e e l  t h a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  on t h e  
l o c a l  b a t t l e f i e l d  i s  going s o  badly, and de f ea t  i s  s o  i n t o l e r -  
ab le ,  t h a t  t he  only a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  t o  take  measures (e.g., 
explode a nuclear weapon o r  a l e r t  i t s  s t r a t e g i c  fo rces )  which 
increase t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  general  war w i l l  occur even though 
ne i the r  s ide  wants it. The country doing t h i s  would presumably 
do s o  not  t o  induce pre-emption, but t o  fo rce  the  o ther  s i de  t o  
back down. I f  t h i s  f a i l s ,  t h e  desperate s i de  might come t o  
bel ieve t h a t  t he  p o l i t i c a l  co s t  of not  pre-empting had become so  
g rea t  t h a t  it had no choice but t o  do so. 
DELIBERATE CATALYTIC ACTION 
Nth Country 
General war may be t r iggered  by an ac t i on  of a t h i r d  country 
de l i be r a t e ly  designed t o  lead  one o r  both s i de s  t o  bel ieve t h a t  
a  general war had begun. It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  conceive of t h e  
circumstances i n  which a minor power would decide t o  t r y  t o  
enhance i t s  s e c w i t y  by p r ec ip i t a t i ng  general  war with a l l  t h e  
r i s k s  involved. Even with a  nuclear a r sena l  it would be d i f f i -  
c u l t  f o r  an Nth power t o  simulate an a t t a ck .  I f  t h e  e f f o r t  were 
made and f a i l e d ,  t h e  smaller power would probably s u f f e r  d r a s t i c  
consequences. Faking a s i ng l e  nuclear  accident ,  while easy,  i s  
much l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  succeed.4 But perhaps more important,  t h e  
4. Both s ides  a r e  even l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  t ake  a s i ng l e  nuclear  
explosion a s  a  symbol t h a t  general  war has s t a r t e d  i f  it i s  known 
t h a t  t h i r d  countr ies  have nuclear  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  
consequences of general  war a r e  l i k e l y  t o  look s o  unpredictable 
t h a t  it w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  not impossible, f o r  any small 
power t o  conclude t h a t  it is  l i k e l y  t o  gain from it. 
Subordinate Mil i ta ry  Commander 
Not only might an Nth power seek t o  serve a s  a c a t a l y s t  f o r  
general war, but so  might a subordinate commander wi th in  t h e  
armed forces  of a major power. This danger has been s o  graphi- - - 
c a l l y  depicted i n  a shor t  novel, Red ~ l e r t  , 5  t h a t  it seems 
unnecessary t o  e labora te  on how it might be done. Suf f i ce  it 
t o  say t h a t  t he  l o c a l  commander must command enough forces  t o  
lead one s i de  t o  bel ieve t h a t  war had become very l i k e l y .  He 
might do t h i s  by d isguis ing h i s  ac t ion  a s  a fu l l - sca le  - 
authorized a t t a ck ,  o r ,  l i k e  t he  "hero" of Red Alert, by cornrnit- 
t i n g  enough of t he  fo rce  so  t h a t  h i s  own government decides t h a t  
it must unleash t h e  r e s t  of i ts  forces  o r  f ace  d i sas t rous  
p o l i t i c a l  o r  m i l i t a ry  consequences. 
SABOTAGE. MISCHIEF. AND ESPIONAGE 
Acts of sabotage o r  mischief may p r ec ip i t a t e  general  war 
even though t h i s  may not have been t he - i n t en t i on  of t h e  perpe- 
t r a t o r .  War might r e s u l t  because t he  a c t  f a i l s  o r  because it 
succeeds, but with unintended consequences. Actions of t h i s  
kind might include: spoofing radar  screens,  blowing up an enemy 
nuclear s tockpi le ,  i n t e r f e r i ng  with communications systems, and 
provocative over f l igh t s .  
Such ac t ions  might have a va r i e t y  of motives. Gaining i n t e l -  
l igence  i s  one. Sabotage i s  another.  Exploding a nuclear  weapon 
and attempting t o  make it appear t o  be an accident  i n  t he  o ther  
s i d e ' s  operations might be aimed a t  s trengthening t he  general  
pressures f o r  u n i l a t e r a l  disarmament o r  more pa r t i cu l a r l y ,  f o r  
example, a t - f o r c i n g  t h e  cance l l a t ion  of airborne a l e r t . 6  
5. Peter  Bryant, Red Aler t  (New York: 
Paperback, 3 5$. ) 
Ace Books, Inc.,  1958. 
6. For a d iscuss ion of two "gamesn which began with such a 
nuclear explosion see Max Singer,  "Synopsis of Gaming Exercises 
on Possible Modes of Outbreak of War," i n  The American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences, Summer Study on A r m s  Control: Collected Papers 
(Boston, 1961), pp. 167-71. 
With a few major exceptions both s ides  have been 
remarkably res t ra ined  i n  carrying out  such a c t i v i t i e s ,  perhaps 
because of t he  danger of t r i gge r ing  general  war and because they 
recognize t h a t  what one s i de  does t he  o ther  probably can do and 
t h a t  they a r e  both b e t t e r  off  i f  both abstain.7 
ACCIDENTS 
The term "accidental  warT1 i s  f requent ly  used t o  r e f e r  t o  
a l l  "inadvertent wars;" it seems more convenient however t o  
l i m i t  t he  use of t he  term t o  l i t e r a l  acc idents ,  i . e . ,  events  
which occur without an one wanting them t o .  There a r e  a number 
of such events t h a t  -+ mlg t lead t o  decis ions  t o  i n i t i a t e  a general  
war. Among t he  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  which have been discussed a r e :  a 
nuclear explosion; and geese, t he  moon, o r  meteori tes  on a radar  
screen. The kinds of accidents  t h a t  may cause general  war have 
one th ing  i n  common--they present  ambiguous evidence t o  one o r  
both s ides  which suggests t h a t  general  war may have s t a r t e d  or  i s  
about t o  s t a r t  ( o r  they may convince one s i de  t h a t  t h e  o ther  w i l l  
conclude t h a t  general war i s  about t o  begin). It is  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
see how an accident  of t h i s  kind could lead t o  war. unless one 
s ide  were depending on t a c t i c a l  warning t o  f i r e  i t s  miss i l e s  o r  
t o  move i t s  planes i n t o  a much less vulnerable but  more provoca- 
t i v e  posture. One desc r ip t ion  of t h i s  danger was 
provided by t h e  Soviet  Representative t o  t h e  United Nations i n  a 
Securi ty Council debate of 21 Apri l  1958: 
American generals  r e f e r  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  up t o  t h e  
present  time t h e  American planes have taken off  on t h e i r  
f l i g h t s  and returned t o  t h e i r  bases a s  soon a s  it 
became c l e a r  t h a t  it was a case of f a l s e  alarm. But 
what would happen i f  American mi l i t a ry  personnel observ- 
ing  t h e i r  radar  screens a r e  not  ab le  i n  time t o  determine 
t h a t  a f l y i n g  meteor i s  not  a guided mi s s i l e  and t h a t  a 
f l i g h t - o f  geese i s  not  a f l i g h t  of bombers? Then t h e  
American planes w i l l  continue t h e i r  f l i g h t  and w i l l  
approach t h e  borders of t h e  Soviet  Union. 
But i n  such a case the  need t o  insure  t he  s ecu r i t y  
of t h e  Soviet  people would requ i re  t he  USSR t o  make 
immediate r e t a l i a t o r y  measures t o  e l iminate  t he  oncoming 
7. This r ec ip roca l  abstension from various forms of 
sabotage, mischief,  and i n t e l l i gence  i s  one of t h e  most important 
ex i s t i ng  arms con t ro l  arrangements. 
t h r ea t .  The Soviet Government would l i k e  t o  hope 
t h a t  matters  w i l l  not  go so  f a r .  
I n  order t o  ge t  a c l e a r e r  idea of t h e  extremely 
dangerous character  of a c t s  of t he  United S t a t e s  
/That a r e 7  dangerous t o  peace, it i s  enough t o  ask - 
t h e  quesFion what would happen i f  t he  mi l i t a ry  A i r  
Force of t he  Soviet  Union began t o  a c t  i n  t he  same 
way a s  t he  American A i r  Force is  now act ing? After  
a l l ,  Soviet  radar  screens a l s o  show from time t o  
time b l i p s  which a r e  caused by t h e  f l i g h t  of meteors 
o r  e lec t ron ic  in ter ference ,  I f  i n  such cases Soviet  
a i r c r a f t  a l s o  flew out carrying atom and hydrogen 
bombs i n  t he  d i r e c t i o n  of t h e  United S t a t e s  and i t s  
bases i n  o ther  s t a t e s ,  what s i t u a t i o n  would a r i s e?  
The a i r  f l e e t s  of both s ides ,  having observed 
each other ,  having discerned each other  somewhere 
over the  Arct ic  wastes o r  i n  some other  place,  appar- 
en t l y  would draw the  conclusion na tu r a l  under those 
circumstances, t h a t  a r e a l  enemy a t t a ck  was taking 
place. Then t he  world would inev i t ab ly  be plunged 
i n t o  t he  hurricane of atomic war. (New York Times, 
Apr i l  22, 1958) 
I f  both s ides  depended on t h e  capaci ty of t h e i r  forces  t o  
survive a t t a ck ,  accidents  would be much l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  t r i g g e r  
general war. 
Additional Note . I 
, Y  . ' r w  ' I . - 
* , W J +  
The Soviet  desc r ip t ion  of how an acc iden ta l  war might start *- 
- - - i 
is  more than four  years  o ld  and was not  an  accura te  desc r ip t ion  ., 
of United Sta tes  pblicy even when it was del ivered.  ~ m e r i c a n  
planes  i f  they took off i n  time of c r i s i s  would of course do so .' : ' .- 
i n  order  t o  avoid being destroyed on t he  ground and not because - '  
they might a t t a ck  the  Sovie t  Union before the re  was unmistakable 
evidence of a massive Soviet  a t t ack .  Unless they receive  a posi- . 
t i v e  order  t o  proceed, SAC planes w i l l  t u rn  back long before they* 
reach t he  Soviet  border. Thus American s a f e ty  procedures make 
war--a complete impossibi l i ty.  
3 Soviet  scenario--although not a l l  o ther  scenarios f o r  accidentaLl ' 1  
CHAPTER I11 
THE ROLE OF ARMS CONTROL IN REDUCING THE LIKELIHOOD 
AND DANGER OF "TRIGGERINGv EVENTS 
The danger of inadvertent general war precipi ta ted by one 
or  a combination of the  act ions  j u s t  reviewed, though 
exaggerated i n  some discussions, i s  l i k e l y  t o  be a serious one 
over the  coming decade. Both un i l a t e r a l  mi l i t a ry  policy and 
arms control  agreements (formal o r  informal) can reduce t h i s  
danger. 
There a r e  two approaches by which t h i s  aim can be a t ta ined.  
The f i r s t  involves measures--taken un i l a t e r a l l y  o r  by agreement-- 
which reduce the  l ikelihood of the  occurrence of the  events 
discussed above .8 The second involves measures t o  reduce the  
l ikelihood t h a t  such events, i f  they do occur, w i l l  ac tua l ly  lead 
t o  general war. I n  t h i s  section,  various arms control  measures 
w i l l  be discussed which decrease the  l ikelihood of a par t icu la r  
t r igger ing event occurring o r  t he  danger i f  it does occur. The 
following chapter w i l l  discuss more general measures t o  reduce 
the  danger of pre-emption. 
Measures t o  reduce the  l ikelihood of p o l i t i c a l  c r i s e s  a r e  
beyond the  scope of t h i s  paper. However, a s  was noted above, 
c r i s e s  a r e  dangerous precisely because the  other "triggering" 
8. For an extensive discussion of the  f ac to r s  t h a t  need t o  
be considered i n  the  evaluation of any arms control  proposal, see 
Schelling and Halperin, Strategy and A r m s  Control, pp. 43-74. 
events discussed above a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  lead t o  inadvertent 
general war i f  they occur during a c r i s i s .  Hence act ions  which 
reduce the  likelihood of these events a l s o  reduce the  
seriousness of the  c r i s i s .  Three types of arms control  measures 
w i l l  be discussed below: l o c a l  war measures, atom-free zones, 
and accident and mischief prevention. Atom-free zones a r e  aimed 
a t  reducing the  danger of l o c a l  war and Nth country c a t a l y t i c  
action. No spec i f ic  measures are  discussed which dea l  with the  
subordinate commander problem. I n  the  sect ion on accident and 
mischief prevention, agreements which dea l  with l i t e r a l  accidents 
a s  well a s  sabotage, mischief, and espionage a r e  discussed. 
LOCAL WAR MEASURES 
Arms control  agreements aimed a t  preventing l o c a l  wars from 
leading t o  inadvertent general war may seek t o  prevent the  out- 
break of any l o c a l  violence or  aim a t  r e s t r i c t i n g  the  l e v e l  of 
l o c a l  violence i n  ways t h a t  make it l e s s  l i k e l y  t h a t  the  violence 
w i l l  t r igger  a pre-emptive general war. It would probably be 
impossible t o  put i n t o  operation an arms control  measure aimed a t  
preventing loca l  violence, because it i s  by no means c l ea r  t h a t  
both s ides  have a common or an equal i n t e r e s t  i n  i t s  prevention. 
As Chairman Khrushchev has recently made c lear ,g  the  Soviet Union 
is  determined t o  prevent l o c a l  wars which a re  Western-inspired. 
But the  Communists a l s o  a s s e r t  the  inevi table  necessi ty of 
Communist-sponsored l o c a l  warfare, par t i cu la r ly  i n t e rna l  revolu- 
t ions .  Likewise, t he  United S ta tes  seems determined t o  t r y  t o  
prevent the  C m u n i s t  use of force i n  l o c a l  areas ,  but,  t o  under- 
s t a t e  the  case somewhat, was not prepared t o  stop the  invasion of 
Cuba by Cuban rebels.  
Thus, although a t  ce r t a in  times one o r  more major powers may 
have a posi t ive  incentive t o  i n i t i a t e  o r  t o  encourage l o c a l  
aggression or  i n t e rna l  revolution, there  may be other times and 
piaces when there  is  a j o i n t  i n t e r e s t  i n  reducing the  l ikelihood 
of l o c a l  war. This may be par t icu la r ly  t rue  of those l o c a l  wars 
which might s t a r t  even though nei ther  major power intends them to .  
9. See, fo r  example, Khrushchevts speech on the  November 1960 
Communist Party Conference. The speech has been reprinted widely, 
e.g., The current  Digest of the  soviet  Press, X I 1 1  ( ~ e b r u a r y  1 5  and 
22, 1961). The most convenient repr in t ing  is i n  a pamphlet edi ted 
by-Burton Marshall and published by the  Washington Center of 
Foreign Policy Research. The t e x t  of the  Conference statement is 
a l so  included. 
I f  an undesired l o c a l  war might be s t a r t e d  by an "incident," 
measures t o  avoid "incidentsn might be j o i n t l y  pursued. I f  
pa r t i cu l a r  minor power members of the  major power blocs might 
i n i t i a t e  war t h a t  would drag t he  major powers i n ,  measures t o  
r e s t r a i n  a l l i e s  might be j o i n t l y  undertaken;lO i f  t h e  mere 
existence of m i l i t a ry  forces  i n  pa r t i cu l a r  a reas  increases t h e  
l ikel ihood of both s ides  being drawn i n t o  mi l i t a ry  ac t i on  t h a t  
they may both deplore,  measures t o  synchronize withdrawal may be 
possible.  I n  pa r t i cu l a r ,  t h e  major powers a r e  l i k e l y  t o  have a 
j o i n t  i n t e r e s t  i n  preventing wars among minor, uncommitted nat ions.  
Measures t o  prevent l o c a l  wars might be informal o r  formal. 
A j o i n t  arms embargo t o  a pa r t i cu l a r  region might r e s u l t  from a 
policy announced by one s ide ,  t o  r e f r a i n  from shipping arms i f  
the other  a l s o  r e f r a i n s ,  o r  from an i n t e rna t i ona l  t r e a t y .  A r m s  
embargoes may r e l a t e  t o  pa r t i cu l a r  countr ies  (e.g., Laos) o r  
continents  (e,g., Africa) .  They may d e a l  with a l l  weapons o r  j u s t  
c e r t a i n  ones, 
Many po t en t i a l  arms con t ro l  measures t o  reduce t he  l i k e l i -  
hood of l o c a l  war would requ i re  de l i be r a t e  and recognizable major 
p o l i t i c a l  set t lements .  Such proposals as disengagement i n  Europe, 
j o i n t  neu t ra l i za t ion  of p a r t i c u l a r  countr ies ,  and boundary s e t t l e -  
ments c l e a r l y  involve an element of arms con t ro l  designed t o  
reduce t he  dangers of l o c a l  war, but they a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  p o l i t i -  
c a l  set t lements  with a small arms con t ro l  component. Some arms 
con t ro l  measures designed t o  prevent l o c a l  war without r equ i r ing  
p o l i t i c a l  set t lements  might prove t o  be more e a s i l y  c a r r i ed  out  
than arrangements deal ing  d i r e c t l y  with t h e  s t r a t e g i c  balance 
i t s e l f .  Cooperation i n  t h i s  a rea  might be informal and produce 
l e s s  d i f f i c u l t  inspect ion and regu la t ion  problems. Further ,  t h e  
j o i n t  i n t e r e s t  might be e a s i e r  t o  embody i n  a concrete agreement. 
Agreements t o  l i m i t  l o c a l  war may be more l i k e l y  than agree- 
ments t o  reduce t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  of l o c a l  war. A r m s  con t ro l  agree- 
ments o r  informal understandings designed t o  e s t a b l i s h  limits 
during a l o c a l  war could take  a number of forms. The process of 
l im i t i ng  war very l i k e l y  w i l l  r equ i re  some e x p l i c i t  o r  t a c i t  
bargaining, and arms understandings reached before t h e  war may 
f a c i l i t a t e  t he  process. Prewar arrangements may simply cons i s t  of 
United States-Soviet  d iscuss ions  (formal o r  more l i k e l y  very 
informal) of l imi ted  war. Such c m u n i c a t i o n  of views would make 
10. The Russians may some day be i n t e r e s t ed  i n  such agree- 
ments t o  prevent t h e  Chinese from in sp i r i ng  o r  undertaking l o c a l  
wars. 
it c l ea r  t o  each s i de  t h a t  t h e  o ther  accepted t he  notion of t h e  
l imi ted  use of force  i n  t h e  nuclear-missile age. It could mean 
t h a t ,  i f  a l imi ted  war d id  break out ,  ne i the r  would regard it 
necessar i ly  a s  a s t r a t e g i c  a t t a ck  t h a t  meant t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  of 
general war. Such prewar d iscuss ion might a l s o  f a c i l i t a t e  t he  
e x p l i c i t  o r  impl ic i t  negot ia t ions  which might take  place a f t e r  
t he  war broke out.  Uni la te ra l  d iscuss ion of l imi ted  war such a s  
has been going on i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  can a l s o  serve t h i s  
function by making American a t t i t u d e s  towards l imi ted  war c l e a r  
t o  t he  Soviet  Union. 
The danger of measures designed t o  keep l o c a l  wars l imi ted  
must be recognized. J u s t  a s  agreements t o  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  s t r a t e -  
g i c  balance may make l o c a l  wars more l i k e l y ,  s o  agreements which 
serve t o  f a c i l i t a t e  keeping l o c a l  wars l imi ted  may make t h e  out- 
break of such wars more l i k e l y .  I f  one of t h e  f a c to r s  t h a t  
prevent l o c a l  wars i s  t he  f e a r  of both s i de s  t h a t  general  war 
w i l l  be p rec ip i t a ted  thereby, agreements which make such an 
explosion l e s s  l i k e l y  may make l o c a l  wars more l i k e l y .  But t h i s  
could well  be a reasonable p r ice  t o  pay f o r  reducing t h e  proba- 
b i l i t y  t h a t  l o c a l  wars w i l l  not  t r i g g e r  general war. 
A r m s  con t ro l  agreements and understandings might be designed 
t o  e s t ab l i sh  spec i f i c  r u l e s  under which a l o c a l  war would be 
fought. The United S t a t e s  might seek t o  use arms con t ro l  negotia- 
t i ons  and agreements t o  help  e s t ab l i sh  t h e  kinds of r u l e s  under 
which it wishes t o  f i g h t  a l o c a l  war. This involves two kinds of 
problems. F i r s t ,  what r u l e s  a r e  most l i k e l y  t o  contr ibute  t o  
reducing t he  danger of t r i gge r ing  a general  war? Second, what 
r u l e s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be t o  t he  mi l i t a ry  advantage of t h e  US i n  
pursuing i t s  objec t ives  i n  a l o c a l  war? Although a number of 
pressures a r e  l i k e l y  t o  a f f e c t  t he  decis ion of e i t h e r  s i de  t o  
expand o r  l i m i t  a l o c a l  war o r  t o  i n i t i a t e  a pre-emptive s t r i k e ,  
c e r t a i n  broad, dramatic kinds of l i m i t s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be most 
possible t o  agree on; and these  l i m i t s  a r e  probably t h e  most 
important i n  reducin t he  danger t h a t  a l o c a l  war w i l l  t r i g g e r  a 
pre-emptive s t r i k e . l g  There have been a t  l e a s t  four  major l i m i t s  
11. For a d iscuss ion of t he  kinds of limits which a r e  most 
l i k e l y  t o  form the  bas i s  of t a c i t  bargaining during a l imi ted  war, 
see Thomas C. Schell ing,  "Bargaining, Communication, and Limited 
War," The Journal  of Conf l ic t  Resolution, March 1957, pp. 19-36. 
which have been observed i n  a l l  l o c a l  wars fought since the  
Second World War: 
1. The non-use of nuclear weapons. 
2. The abstention from confrontation i n  b a t t l e  of 
Soviet and American troops .I2 
3 .  The recognition a s  a sanctuary of supply l i n e s  
outside the  immediate b a t t l e f i e l d  area.  
4. The recognition a s  a sanctuary of t he  homelands 
of the  ma j or  powers. 
It would seem t h a t  the  observance of these four limits, 
plus the  confinement of t h e  war t o  a r e l a t i ve ly  small geographic 
area ,  s ign i f ican t ly  reduces the  danger of l o c a l  war t r igger ing  
a s t r a t eg i c  war. Perhaps the  best  way of es tabl ishing these 
kinds of ru l e s  is  t o  observe them. I n  a sense, the  United S ta tes  
and the  Soviet Union a r e  current  par t ic ipants  i n  powerful arms 
control  agreements which l i m i t  the  use of force  i n  these four 
ways, a s  well a s  i n  others. The continued observance of t he  ru l e s  
by both s ides  while they support the  use of force re inforces  t he  
expectation of both t h a t  these limits w i l l  continue t o  be 
preserved. Insofar a s  each s ide  i s  in te res ted  i n  es tabl ishing 
limits and observing them, it can have a reasonable expectation 
t h a t  the  other s ide  w i l l  reciprocate.  There i s  another reason 
why the  observance of these limits i s  l i k e l y  t o  be important and 
compelling. Both s ides  have learned through experience t h a t  i f  
these ru l e s  a r e  observed a l o c a l  war can remain l imited.  The 
breaking of one of these  l i m i t s  would be a dramatic point i n  any 
l imited war. Both s ides  would ask themselves whether t h e  breaking 
of the  l i m i t  meant t h a t  general war had become inevi table  and t h a t  
the  only prudent course would be t o  s t r i k e  f i r s t .  
1 2 .  Both the  United S ta tes  and the  Soviet Union have been 
very circumspect i n  committing t h e i r  troops t o  a l o c a l  war; thus 
a number of these wars have been fought without e i t h e r  American 
or Soviet troops par t ic ipat ing.  An agreement might be sought t o  
reinforce t h i s  r u l e  a s  well  a s  the  more l imi ted r u l e  t h a t  major 
power troops do not confront each other i n  ba t t l e .  The l a t t e r  
r u l e  would give a great  premium t o  t h e  s ide  f i r s t  committing i t s  
forces . 
Having established these l i m i t s  by observing them, both 
sides may be i n  somewhat of a s t r a i t  jacket. They may be unable 
t o  break the  limits without creat ing such a danger of inadvertent 
general war t h a t  it i s  not worth the  r i sk .  Given these condi- 
t ions ,  it may be desi rable  fo r  both s ides  t o  re inforce  fur ther  
these four l imi t s  on l o c a l  war i n  an attempt t o  make it even l e s s  
l i k e l y  t h a t  they w i l l  be broken. But there  is a subs tan t ia l  cos t  
involved. Either by de l ibera te  decision of one or  both s ides ,  o r  
inadvertently, one of these limits may be crossed i n  a l o c a l  war 
and a grave danger of general war created. To re inforce  these 
limits, therefore,  may increase the  r i s k  of general war, i f  t h e  
limits a r e  broken. 
The question of the  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o r  undesi rabi l i ty  of 
strengthening the  nuclear--non-nuclear l i n e  i l l u s t r a t e s  t he  prob- 
lems involved i n  evaluating arms control  proposals i n  l o c a l  war. 
The United S ta tes  must f i r s t  determine i f  t he  non-use of nuclear 
weapons i s  i n  i t s  in te res t13  and secondly, i f  it does so  determine, 
it must decide which arms control  proposals, s ingly  o r  i n  a group, 
w i l l  contribute t o  non-use without jeopardizing other secur i ty  
objectives .I4 
13. For the  argument t h a t  t he  use of nuclear weapons i n  l o c a l  
war is  not i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of t he  United S ta tes  see Morton H. 
Halperin, "Nuclear Weapons and Limited War," The Journal  of 
Conflict  Resolution, June 1961, pp. 146-66. 
14. Tor an extended evaluation of two spec i f i c  proposals and 
general discussion of t he  r o l e  of arms control  i n  reducing the  
l ikelihood t h a t  nuclear weapons a r e  used i n  l o c a l  wars, see 
Morton H. Halperin, A Proposal f o r  a Ban on the  Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Special Studies Group Study Memorandum Number 4 ( I n s t i -  
t u t e  f o r  Defense Analyses, Washington, D.C., 1961), and Donald G. 
Brennan and Morton H. Halperin, "Policy Considerations of a 
Nuclear-Test Ban," i n  Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament, 
and National Security (New York: George Braz i l l e r ,  1961), pp. 234- 
66 . 
ATOM-FREE ZONES 
Atom-free zones have been proposed fo r  both ~ u r o p e l s  and 
the  Far ~ a s t . 1 6  Such proposals would have l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on 
mi l i t a ry  capabi l i ty ;  they presumably would ban the  s ta t ion ing  
of atomic weapons--and perhaps of launching vehicles which could 
only be used with atomic weapons--in par t i cu la r  areas  o r  zones. 
Since the  United S ta tes  and presumably the  Soviets a r e  develop- 
ing dual-purpose launching equipment, t h i s  withdrawal would 
probably not be a serious check. And since nuclear weapons 
presumably could be f i r e d  i n t o  the  area of combat by b a l l i s t i c  
miss i les  or  by t a c t i c a l  planes from outside t he  area  of canbat, 
agreements on atom- f r e e  zones would not i n  themselves, from a 
mi l i t a ry  standpoint,  reduce the  l ikelihood t h a t  nuclear weapons 
would be used i n  a loca l  war o r ,  i n  f a c t ,  reduce the  e f fec t ive-  
ness with which they could be used, even very quickly. However, 
the  conclusion of such an agreement might have some implications 
which reduce the  l ikelihood t h a t  nuclear weapons would be used 
i n  a l imited war and hence would reduce the  l ikelihood t h a t  t he  
war would expand beyond the  point  t h a t  brought on pre-emption. 
An agreement on an atom-free zone might h a l t  t he  spread of 
nuclear weapons. It would a l s o  keep such weapons out of t he  
hands of troops on the  f ron t  l ines .  It i s  v i t a l l y  important not 
t o  have nuclear weapons with troops which can be overrun i n  t h e  
ear ly  days of ba t t l e .  Even i f  such troops have s t r i c t  orders not  
t o  use atomic weapons without authorization,  it is very l i k e l y  
t h a t  they would use them ra the r  than allow themselves t o  be over- 
run and destroyed. Since there  may be very strong p o l i t i c a l  
pressure from the  Germans i n  NATO t o  s t a t i o n  atomic weapons r i g h t  
i n  the  f ron t  l i n e s ,  an atom-free zone agreement may be the  only 
sa t i s fac tory  way of a l t e r i n g  t h i s  s i t ua t ion  . l 7  
1 5 .  A t  l e a s t  sane versions of the  Rapacki plan a r e  proposals 
fo r  atom-fPee zones ra ther  than the  withdrawal of troops. 
16. For a discussion of possible Chinese a t t i t u d e s  towards 
an atom-free zone, see A. Doak Barnett,  "The Inclusion of 
Communist China i n  an Arms-Control P r ~ g r a m , ~ ~  i n  Brennan (ed.) 
Arms Control, Disarmament, and ~ a t i o n a l '  Securi ty,  pp. 282-303, 
and Alice Langley Hsieh, flCommunist China and Nuclear Warfare," 
The China quar ter ly ,  I (April-June 1960), pp. 1-15. 
17.  Implied here and a t  several  other points  i n  the  discus- 
sion i s  the  notion t h a t  in ternat ional ly  negotiated arms control  
agreements may serve a s  a lever  t o  force  t he  United S ta tes  and 
Perhaps the  major value of atom-free zone agreements, 
however, i s  t h a t  they would fur ther  highl ight  and sharpen the  
expectation t h a t  neither s ide  would use nuclear weapons i n  a 
l imited war. By signing such agreements, both s ides  might be 
i n  f a c t  s ignaling t o  the  other t h a t ,  while they i n  f a c t  
an t ic ipa te  the  possible outbreak of violence i n  t h e  area ,  they 
would not introduce the use of nuclear weapons i n  t h a t  area;  
they would not use nuclear weapons a s  a matter of course; and 
they would r e f r a i n  from using them u n t i l  t he  other s ide  used 
them. Atom-free zone agreements would probably be an important 
and useful  complement t o  other agreements aimed a t  neutra l iz ing 
the  use of nuclear weapons; and, even i n  the  absence of such a 
complex of agreements, might be valuable i n  increasing t h e  
shared expectation t h a t  a t  l e a s t  i n  ce r t a in  areas ,  and, by 
inference, i n  other areas ,  nuclear weapons were not t o  be used. 
ACCIDENT PREVENTION 
Some measures f o r  accident prevention may i n  f a c t  increase 
the  likelihood of an inadvertent general war by increasing the  
chances t h a t  an accident would lead t o  war. This may be because 
the  agreement i t s e l f  stigmatizes the  occurrence of the  accident 
(so  t h a t  i f  it does occur, it appears not t o  be an accident) ,  o r  
it may be t h a t  the  agreement i n  a gene= way causes the  s t r a t e -  
g ic  forces of both s ides  t o  be more vulnerable and hence increases 
the  l ikelihood of inadvertent general war. An example of both 
cases might be an agreement t o  take precautions t o  prevent acci-  
den ta l  nuclear explosions. The hoped-for r e s u l t  of such an 
i ts  a l l i e s  t o  take s teps  which a r e  of value independent of t he  
formal arms control  agreement and even i f  taken un i l a t e r a l l y  with- 
out reciprocation. This i s  not meant t o  imply t h a t  it i s  
impossible t o  develop un i l a t e r a l  mi l i t a ry  policy along the  neces- 
sary l i n e s  without an agreement; but two things a r e  implied. One 
i s  simply t h a t  it may be more l i k e l y  t h a t  these m n g s  w i l l  be 
accanplished i f  they a re  discussed and implemented i n  terms of 
arms control  ra ther  than un i l a t e r a l  mi l i t a ry  policy, The reasons 
fo r  doing them may be c leare r  i f  one focuses on the  dimension of 
mi l i t a ry  policy which involves cooperation with po ten t ia l  enemies. 
Secondly, t he  signing of an agreement may create  excuses--and even 
a rationale--for the  United S ta tes  or  t he  Soviet Union f o r  r e s i s t -  
ing pressures from i ts  a l l i e s .  It s e t s  up addi t ional  costs  t o  
them f o r  not doing it, because they would be breaking an arms 
control  agreement. 
agreement would be t o  reduce t he  l ike l ihood t h a t  an accident  
would occur, and reduce general  nervousness on both s ides  about 
what might r e s u l t  from such an accident  by lowering f o r  both 
t he  expectat ion t h a t  t he  o ther  w i l l  permit an accident  t o  t ake  
place. But  another unavoidable r e s u l t  would be t h a t ,  i n  t h e  
event t h a t  a nuclear weapon d id  go o f f ,  both s i de s  would be much 
more prone t o  bel ieve t h a t  it was not  an  accident .  Such agree- 
ments, by put t ing  checks on t h e  loca t ion  and con t ro l  of nuclear 
weapons, might a l s o  increase t he  vu lnerab i l i ty  of both s i de s  t o  
a t t ack .  These r i s k s ,  however, seem worth taking. It would 
probably be des i rab le  f o r  t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  d iscuss  with t h e  
Soviet  Union i n  an informal way t h e  whole range of poss ib le  
l i t e r a l  accidents  and t o  d iscuss  an exchange of information about 
ways t o  reduce t h i s  l ike l ihood.  This kind of negot ia t ing ,  a s  
many of t he  o thers  t o  be discussed below, would have t o  be 
extremely informal, perhaps even unof f i c ia l .  
An agreement t o  ban airborne a l e r t s  might provide another 
example of t he  second problem, an arms con t ro l  agreement which 
reduced t he  l ike l ihood of an accident  while increas ing t h e  danger 
of general  war. An airborne a l e r t  increases t h e  l ike l ihood of 
accidents ,  and perhaps t he  l ike l ihood of nuclear  accidents ,  simply 
by increasing t he  number of f l y i n g  hours and t h e  number of times 
t h a t  nuclear weapons a r e  c a r r i ed  a l o f t .  However, it may be t h a t  
some forms of airborne a ler t - - those  which involve sending planes 
away from t h e  enemy t e r r i t o r y  and not  towards i t - - a re  a very 
important p a r t  of an invulnerable s t r a t e g i c  posture,  a s t r a t e g i c  
posture which involves taking no menacing s t ep s  i n  t he  event t h a t  
one suspects  an a t t ack .  A proper kind of a i rborne  a l e r t  might be 
reassur ing r a t h e r  than provocative during a c r i s i s  and might make 
a subs t an t i a l  contr ibut ion t o  reducing t he  l ike l ihood of pre- 
emptive war. Here a proper balancing between t h e  two goals ,  
reducing t h e  l ike l ihood of accidents  and reducing t h e  l ike l ihood 
t h a t  accidents  would lead t o  inadvertent  general  war, i s  more 
d i f f i c u l t .  It would depend i n  p a r t  upon how l i k e l y  accidents  a r e  
during an airborne a l e r t ;  whether o ther  measures can be taken t o  
reduce t he  seriousness of t he  accidents ;  and f i n a l l y ,  whether an 
airborne a l e r t  needs t o  be an important component of an invulner- 
ab le  s t r a t e g i c  system. 
Exchanges of warning f a c i l i t i e s  between t h e  two s ides ;  t h e  
construct ion of radar  on t he  o ther  s i d e ' s  t e r r i t o r y ,  o r  c lose  t o  
t he  o ther  s i d e ' s  t e r r i t o r y ;  o r  o ther  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  last-minute 
t a c t i c a l  i n t e l l i gence  might reduce t h e  incidence of false-alarm 
type accidents  by increas ing t he  r e l i a b i l i t y  of warning systems 
and improving t h e  flow of evidence t o  each s ide .  I f  both s i de s  
came t o  depend l e s s  on t h e i r  own radar screens, which a r e  subject  
t o  accidents, and more on l e s s  accident-prone s t r a t e g i c  or  
t a c t i c a l  warning systems s e t  up by agreement, the  danger of war 
because of an accidental  reading may be subs tan t ia l ly  reduced. 
Some increased warning f a c i l i t i e s ,  however, might a l s o  increase 
the  f a l s e  alarm r a t e  and some super f ic ia l ly  a t t r a c t i v e  schemes 
of mutual warning probably could- not communicate rapidly  enough 
t o  be of use within the  very shor t  span of time. It may be t h a t  
the  thirty-minute delivery period of in tercont inental  b a l l i s t i c  
miss i les  has eliminated the  poss ib i l i t y  of using a l t e rna t ive  
agreed warning systems t o  supplement warning systems which a r e  
prone t o  accidents, 
There i s  a l s o  a poss ib i l i t y  of agreements by which both s ides  
r e f r a in  from kinds of a c t i v i t i e s  which would spoof or i n t e r f e r e  
with radar systems. We now seem t o  have a very important informal 
arms control  agreement i n  e f f e c t  between the  Soviet Union and the  
United S ta tes  by which each r e f r a in s  from spoofing radar screens, 
from t e s t i n g  them by f ly ing  planes over them, and from seeking i n  
other ways t o  discover how well they work. A s  other measures a r e  
taken which e i t h e r  un i l a t e r a l l y  o r  by agreement s t a b i l i z e  the  
s t r a t eg i c  balance and make it l e s s  l i k e l y  t h a t  miss i les  w i l l  be 
f i r e d  on ambiguous evidence, it may be t h a t ,  without a formal 
agreement, both s ides  may t r y  t o  spoof radar systems by f ly ing  
in to  them or  t o  i n t e r f e r e  with communication systems. It there- 
fo re  may be desi rable  t o  t r y  t o  so l id i fy  the  present s t a t u s  quo 
while it s t i l l  looks very dangerous f o r  both s ides  t o  carry on 
such a c t i v i t i e s .  Such a formal agreement i n  e f f e c t  might serve t o  
reduce the  l ikelihood t h a t  the  informal agreement would be broken 
once the  s t r a t eg i c  system i s  s tab i l i zed .  
CHAPTER IV 
REDUCING THE F'RESSURE TO PRE-EMPT 
The s i t ua t i ons  discussed above a r e  l i k e l y  t o  l ead  t o  
general  war only i f  t he r e  i s  an advantage i n  s t r i k i n g  f i r s t .  
Only i f  t h i s  advantage i s  believed t o  e x i s t ,  o r  i f  s t r a t e g i c  
doct r ine  r e f l e c t s  t he  be l i e f  t h a t  it e x i s t s ,  i s  it l i k e l y  t h a t  
inadvertent  general  war could take  place. S t r a t eg i c  s t a b i l i t y  
of t h e  kind assumed i n  t h i s  paper would s t i l l  imply a g r ea t  
premium on launching a f i r s t  s t r i k e  i f  war became inev i t ab le .  
Thus u n i l a t e r a l  o r  arms con t ro l  measures which would reduce t h e  
advantage of launching a f i r s t  s t r i k e  would do much t o  reduce 
t h e  danger of inadver tent  ( a s  w e l l  a s  premeditated) general  war. 
I f  ne i the r  s i de  perceives an advantage i n  s t r i k i n g  f i r s t ,  
i t s  forces  need not be s e t  on a h a i r l i n e  t r i gge r .  Thus coopera- 
t i v e  o r  u n i l a t e r a l  measures t o  improve t he  a b i l i t y  of each s i d e ' s  
s t r a t e g i c  fo rces  t o  survive an a t t a ck ,  and t o  remain under good 
command and con t ro l  under a t t a ck ,  might slow down t h e  tempo of 
decisions.  - Slowing down decis ions  on t he  brink of war not  only 
means t h a t  e i t h e r  s i de  can, i f  it so  wishes, take  more time to -  
a s ce r t a i n  whether o r  not t he  war has already s t a r t ed ;  it a l s o  
means t h a t  each can impute l e s s  impetuous ac t i on  t o  t h e  o ther  and 
reduce thereby t h e  need f o r  i t s  own quick react ion .  Slowinq down 
the  tempo of decis ions  thus becanes possible.  However, sucfi 
ac t ions  would reduce t he  c r e d i b i l i t y  of American t h r e a t s  t o  strike 
f i r s t  , 
If  t h e  United S t a t e s  wants t o  use t h e  t h r e a t  of general  war 
a s  an e x p l i c i t  d e t e r r en t  i n  deal ing  with l o c a l  war s i t ua t i ons  and 
p o l i t i c a l  c r i s e s ,  it probably cannot subscribe t o  t h e  kinds of 
arms con t ro l  proposals t o  be discussed below. However, should 
t he  United S t a t e s  decide t h a t  it is  prepared t o  dea l  with these  
o ther  s i t ua t i ons  without increas ing t h e  t h r e a t  of general  war 
(recognizing t h a t  t h i s  t h r e a t  w i l l  always e x i s t  t o  some degree 
no matter  what arms con t ro l  measures a r e  agreed upon), t he  way 
may be open f o r  measures which reduce t he  l ike l ihood t h a t  any 
ex te rna l  events w i l l  l ead  t o  general  war. Three poss ib le  measures 
w i l l  be discussed: d i r e c t  Soviet-American communication systems, 
c r i s i s  agreements, and slow-reacting s t r a t e g i c  systems. 
DIRECT SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 
It appears, f r m  unclass i f ied  sources, t h a t  t he r e  i s  not  a t  
present any o f f i c i a l  means of d i r e c t  communication between t he  
Kremlin and t he  White House i n  t h e  event of a major c r i s i s .  Such 
a d i r e c t  communication system might be of g r ea t  value i n  reducing 
t he  l ike l ihood t h a t  various events could t r i g g e r  inadver tent  war. 
It would symbolize f o r  both s ides  t h e i r  d e s i r e  t o  be res t ra ined  
i n  a c r i s i s ,  t h e i r  de s i r e  not t o  allow events t o  drag  them i n t o  
war, and it would provide an important means f o r  each s i de  t o  
reassure  t he  o ther  t h a t  war was not  about t o  s t a r t .  It would 
enable them t o  explain a f a l s e  alarm o r  t o  agree t o  wait and t o  
discover t h e  cause of a pa r t i cu l a r  event.  Clearly such a system 
might be abused t o  communicate t h r e a t s  and might increase  t h e  
expectation of one s ide  t h a t  a f i r s t  s t r i k e  could be successful  
by paralyzing t he  w i l l  of t h e  opponent. On t h e  o the r  hand, such 
a communication system may be c r u c i a l  f o r  both s ides  i f  they 
d e s i r e  t o  l i m i t  general  war .I8 On balance, it would seem t h a t  
such a communication system i s  worthwhile and des i rab le ,  
CRISIS AGREEMENTS 
The value of c r i s i s  agreements i s  t h a t  they would imply t h e  
d e s i r e  of both s i de s  not  t o  l e t  a c r i s i s  lead  t o  inadvertent  
general  war. Spec i f i ca l ly ,  prepar ing-for- r i s i s  arms con t ro l  
would suggest planning and discuss ion between t he  two s ides  of 
possible inspect ion  schemes f o r  reassur ing each other  t h a t  could 
go i n t o  e f f e c t  i n  a c r i s i s ,  but would not be p o l i t i c a l l y  tenable  
during peacetime, Both s ides  might d iscuss  ways i n  which 
18. For a d iscuss ion of t he  motives t h a t  might lead  both 
s ides  t o  want t o  l i m i t  general  war, see Schell ing and Halperin, 
Strategy and A r m s  Control, pp. 21-24, 
inspect ion could be ca r r i ed  on, ways i n  which inspect ion  could 
reassure  t h e  other--without a c tua l l y  agreeing t o  i n s t i t u t e  t he  
inspect ion during a non-cris is  period.19 
The United S t a t e s  might u n i l a t e r a l l y  undertake t o  t r a i n  a 
group of inspectors  who would be ava i l ab le  i n  c r i s i s  s i t u a t i o n s  
and t o  develop equipment which might be valuable during a c r i s i s .  
The Soviets  might be encouraged t o  do l ikewise.  The whole a r ea  
of c r i s i s  arms con t ro l  r equ i res  a good dea l  of imaginative study. 
What kind of stand-by agreements can we make with t h e  Russians, 
or  what kind of u n i l a t e r a l  ac t ion  can we take  which would f a c i l i -  
t a t e  t he  sudden enactment of arms con t ro l  during a c r i s i s  i n  
which each s i de  wanted despera te ly  t o  assure t h e  o the r  t h a t  it 
is  not  about t o  i n i t i a t e  nuclear  war? 
SLOW-REACTING STRATEGIC SYSTEMS 
Even i f ,  on t h e  bas i s  of t echn ica l  s t r a t e g i c  ana lys i s ,  t h e r e  
does not appear t o  be any advantage t o  s t r i k i n g  f i r s t ,  it may 
s t i l l  appear t o  t h e  policy-maker t h a t  t he r e  i s  a major advantage 
i n  carrying out  a contro l led ,  well-coordinated a t t ack .  Even i f  
it i s  only t he  sense of being i n  con t ro l  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  of 
being master of one's moves, the re  may be s t rong imperatives t o  
"get on withn t he  war and not  wait f o r  someone else t o  begin it. 
This suggests t h e  v i t a l  importance of developing i n  advance of a 
c r i s i s  slow-reacting s t r a t e g i c  systems (systems which c l e a r l y  
depend f o r  t h e i r  su rv iva l  not  on a t t ack ing  f i r s t ,  but  on t h e i r  
a b i l i t y  t o  withstand a t t a c k ) ,  and of developing well-protected 
command and con t ro l  systems which suggest t o  t h e  leading policy- 
making o f f i c i a l s  t h a t  they w i l l  i n  f a c t  be ab le  t o  con t ro l  t h e i r  
s t r a t e g i c  forces  even a f t e r  an a t t ack .  This i s  important because 
it should reduce t he  s t r a t e g i c  incent ives  f o r  s t r i k i n g  f i r s t  a s  
well  a s  t he  i n t e r n a l  pressures on policy-makers t o  s t r i k e  f i r s t .  
I n  f a c t ,  some kinds of measures, whether adopted u n i l a t e r a l l y  o r  
by agreement,.may make it impossible t o  s t r i k e  quickly. A major, 
and perhaps t he  p r inc ipa l ,  way i n  which t he  danger of inadvertent  
general war can be subs t an t i a l l y  reduced i s  by t he  adoption by 
both s ides  of slow-reacting s t r a t e g i c  forces .  
19. See T. C. Schell ing,  "Ams Control: Proposal f o r  a 
Specia l  Survei l lance Force," World P o l i t i c s ,  XI11 (October 1960), 
pp. 1-19. 
The essence of t h i s  system i s  t h a t  it does not depend on 
warning f o r  i t s  survival ,  and t h a t ,  i f  it gets  warning, it uses 
it i n  ways which do not decrease the  time it would take t o  
a t tack the  other side.  S t ra teg ic  forces i n  t h i s  s i t ua t ion  
depend f o r  t h e i r  effectiveness on t h e i r  survivabi l i ty .  This 
survivabi l i ty  may be the  r e s u l t  of hardening or  mobility. What 
i s  ruled out a re  systems of invulnerabi l i ty  which depend upon 
warning, such a s  a l e r t  bombers which depend on ge t t ing  i n  the  
a i r  and heading towards the  Soviet Union f o r  t h e i r  protection. 
It would not ru l e  out systems t h a t  maintain a i r c r a f t  on a i r -  
borne a l e r t ,  pa r t i cu la r ly  i f  t h e i r  planes flew i n  an area fur ther  
away from the  Soviet Union than t h e i r  home bases, over the  
Caribbean and South America, ra ther  than Canada and Alaska. Such 
a system would a l so  require  e f fec t ive  command-contzol over the 
forces which could survive a nuclear a t tack,  It would depend on 
the  c i v i l i a n  leadership of the  government being confident it 
could survive a nuclear a t t ack  so  it could e f fec t ive ly  camnand 
i ts  forces,  determine what t a rge t s  they should a t tack,  and which 
forces should be used. And it would require t h a t ,  should one s ide  
expect nuclear war, it would not do anything provocative. Ideal ly ,  
a slow-reacting s t r a t eg i c  system should make it possible t o  do 
absolutely nothing even i f  one suspects t h a t  war is  about t o  come. 
The s t r a t eg i c  system, including the  command and control  apparatus, 
should be so protected a t  a l l  times t h a t  nothing needs t o  be done 
which suggests t h a t  one thinks t h a t  war is  about t o  break out. 
This i s  probably impossible; a t  the  very l e a s t ,  the  leaders of 
the  government may want t o  move t o  t h e i r  she l te r s .  There may be 
operations which make planes and miss i les  more protected but which 
cannot be maintained a t  a l l  times. It is  v i t a l l y  important t h a t  
such measures not be provocative, t h a t  they not increase the  
speed with which a f i r s t  s t r i k e  can be carr ied out ,  and t h a t  they 
c lear ly  increase the  invulnerabi l i ty  of the  forces r a the r  than 
t h e i r  effectiveness t o  s t r i ke .  
A slow-reacting s t r a t eg i c  posture does not require ,  but i s  
s ign i f ican t ly  enhanced by, both s ides  moving t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  
systems away from major population centers and both s ides  recog- 
nizing t h a t  population centers w i l l  not be t a rge t s  a t  l e a s t  i n  
the  ear ly  stages of a general war. 
Even t h i s  brief  out l ine  of the  slow-reacting posture suggests 
t h a t ,  i n  addit ion t o  reducing the  danger of inadvertent war, it 
has major implications fo r  the  kind of general war s t ra tegy t h a t  
e i t h e r  country adopts. It c lear ly  ru les  out s t r a t eg i e s  which 
depend on massive s t r a t eg i c  s t r i kes ,  par t i cu la r ly  the  policy of 
massive r e t a l i a t i o n ,  and it probably s ign i f ican t ly  reduces t he  
potency of the  t h rea t  of engaging i n  l imited war i n  the  sense 
t h a t  it may bring on an inadvertent general war. It probably 
does not ru l e  out,  and may i n  f a c t  make more credible ,  a policy 
of l imited r e t a l i a t i on .  It probably necess i ta tes  a major 
re l iance on an e f fec t ive  l o c a l  war capabi l i ty  f o r  t he  defense 
of t h i r d  areas. The United S ta tes  could probably proceed on 
i ts  own a long way, though not a l l  the  way, towards implementa- 
t i o n  of such a policy without Russian cooperation. However, it 
is  important t o  note t h a t  the  effectiveness of the  adoption of 
such a policy depends upon i t s  recognition by the  Soviet Union. 
L i t t l e  i s  accomplished by developing slow-reacting s t r a t e g i c  
forces unless the  other s ide  recognized t h e i r  implications. 
Unless we can be sure t h a t  the  Soviets recognize t h a t  we w i l l  
not pre-empt and t h a t  there  i s  no incentive f o r  them t o  pre- 
empt, the  danger of pre-emption may remain very grea t  i f  a 
"triggeringn event occurs. It is only i f  we know t h a t  t he  
Soviets recognize t h a t  we have adopted a slow-reacting s t r a t e g i c  
posture and recognize the  implications of it t h a t  we have i n  
f a c t  broken the  s p i r a l  of expectation which might cause an event 
t o  t r igger  an inadvertent general war. The amount of "agreementn 
here, then, could be minimal: simply Soviet recognition of the  
implications of the  posture which the  United S ta tes  has adopted. 
Much more could be accamplished, however, i f  both s ides  
could agree on the  necessi ty t o  adopt slow-reacting s t r a t e g i c  
systems. Simply an informal discussion of the  problem--an ex- 
change of views by the  two s ides  concerning t h e  means of adopting 
such systems, and acceptance by the  two s ides  of the  need t o  
adopt such systems--would go a long way toward damping the  danger 
of inadvertent general war. Each s ide  would, i n  e f f e c t ,  have 
exchanged an understanding with t he  other,  an agreement not t o  
t r i gge r  such a war, not t o  take measures i n  t he  event of a c r i s i s  
or  accident o r  c a t a l y t i c  act ion which might move both s ides  over 
the  brink of war by beginning the  s p i r a l  of pre-emptive expecta- 
t ion.  
The arms control  agreement might go fu r the r  i n  t h a t  each 
s ide  would agree t o  explain t o  t h e  other the  ways i n  which it 
modified i t s  s t r a t eg i c  forces t o  make them slow-reacting, invul- 
nerable, and l e s s  accident-prone. Such a discussion could 
probably be carr ied on so as  not t o  jeopardize t he  invulnerabi l i ty  
of the  forces. Finally,  there  might be some kinds of interna- 
t i o n a l  inspection machinery or  an exchange of inspection 
f a c i l i t i e s  which would fur ther  enhance the  c r e d i b i l i t y  of t he  
slow-reacting s t r a t eg i c  forces. One of t h e  more in te res t ing  
examples of t h i s  would be an agreement t o  keep submarines i n  hane 
t e r r i t o ry .  Such an agreement could probably be reached i n  a way 
t h a t  would not reveal  the  locat ion of t he  submarines. Before 
pressing fo r  t h i s  kind of inspection agreement it would be neces- 
sary t o  determine how much more would be gained by the  adoption 
of such systems. It is  probably desi rable  a t  l e a s t  i n  the  
i n i t i a l  stages of discussion with the  Soviets not t o  r a i s e  the  
question of these kinds of inspection procedures. I f ,  on the  
basis  of informal discussion and agreement, it appears t h a t  the  
Soviets a re  seriously in teres ted i n  the  mutual adoption of slow- 
reacting s t r a t eg i c  systems, then it might be appropriate t o  
r a i s e  with them the  poss ib i l i ty  of exchanging inspection systems, 
It might, however, be s t ressed t h a t  inspection was not absolutely 
necessary, t h a t  the  establishment of a t  l e a s t  the  informal agree- 
ment did not depend on inspection systems, and t h a t  the  problem 
was t o  work out inspection systems which increased secur i ty  
without exposing the  Soviets t o  espionage o r  i n t e rna l  p o l i t i c a l  
d i f f i c u l t i e s .  The United S ta tes  might, in f a c t ,  want t o  i nv i t e  
the  Soviets t o  design the  inspection procedures i f  they seem t o  
be in teres ted i n  them. 
The agreement sketched here perhaps w i l l  s t r i k e  some readers 
a s  not being arms control  (and even l e s s  trdisarmamentTt). It is  
c lear ly  not something t h a t  one negotiates with panp and circum- 
stance i n  the  Pala is  des Nations i n  Geneva, and not something t o  
which 1 0  or 99 nations could put t h e i r  signatures. 
It is i n  f a c t  probably something t h a t  cannot, and should not,  
be reduced t o  paper. It depends ra ther  on an informal dialogue 
a t  same l e v e l  between the United S ta tes  and the  Soviet Union, 
Such an agreement might not be easy t o  achieve and the  Soviets 
might not even be wi l l ing t o  engage in such a dialogue, but t he  
problem is  d i f f e r en t  from t h a t  of negotiat ing formal agreements. 
There may be no connection between the  SovietsT willingness t o  
negotiate seriously i n  one of these arenas and t h e i r  unwillingness 
t o  negotiate seriously i n  the  other. 
It may be desi rable ,  t o  enhance t h i s  d i s t i nc t ion ,  not t o  
r e f e r  t o  the  measures proposed i n  t h i s  memorandum as ttdisarmamenttl 
o r  even "arms control," but t o  develop sane new terminology which 
does not suggest t o  the  Soviets t h a t  we propose these a s  a 
subs t i tu te  f o r  disarmament negotiations. It may be t h a t  we a r e  
both so committed t o  disarmament a s  a propaganda game t h a t  we 
cannot use it f o r  any other purpose, and t h a t  the  kind of serious 
agreement of a technical  nature suggested here can be carr ied on 
a s  e f fec t ive  serious business only i f  nei ther  s ide  thinks of it 
a s  par t  of the  t r ad i t i ona l  disarmament game. 

